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[Abstract] I analyse the negotiation between two countries, or regions, that are trying to
make an agreement in order to internalize externalities. Local preferences are local
information, but reluctance to participate in the agreement is signaled by delay. Conditions
are derived for when it is efficient to restrict the attention to policies that are uniform across
regions - with and without side payments - and when it is optimal to forbid side payments
in the negotiations. While policy differentiation and side payments let the policy be tailed to
local conditions, they create conflicts between the regions and thus delay. If political
centralization implies uniformity, as is frequently assumed in the federalism literature, the
results describe when centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation. But the results
also provide a foundation for this uniformity assumption and characterize when it is likely
to hold.
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1. Introduction
To get a more favorable deal, it is in any negotiator’s interest to demonstrate a willingness
to walk away. When bargaining power is private information, this motivates the parties
to signal their strength and screen their opponent, even if this is costly. Such ineﬃciencies
are inherent in any bargaining under private information.1 But how can these ineﬃcien-
cies be modified? This paper studies simple constraints on the bargaining agenda and
characterizes when these are valuable.2 By nailing the analysis to a particular example,
the results shed light on existing institutions as well as controversies in the literature on
fiscal federalism.
I study two regions trying to coordinate their policies to internalize externalities. By
reducing or cleaning pollution, say, each region does not only improve the air quality
in its own region; but also in the other region. Local values of clean air, however, are
local knowledge. The regions negotiate the agreement in an alternating oﬀer bargaining
game, where each region can delay as long as it desires before making an oﬀer.3 While
this bargaining game should be interpreted as an example only, it is useful in that (i) it
implements the best "reasonable" mechanism, and (ii) it provides intuition for how this
is achieved. In this context, I ask the following three questions. When would the regions,
behind a veil of ignorance, prefer to commit to "harmonized agreements" where contri-
butions must be uniform across regions? How does the possibility to use side payments
aﬀect the answer? Should side payments be possible?
Economists typically ignore these questions, presuming that policy diﬀerentiation and
side payments obviously are good because they increase the flexibility in negotiations.
But these questions are important for policy advisors. Federal politics are quite often
characterized by extensive harmonization. In the European Union, for example, Article
100a (Single European Act) calls for approximation of laws and harmonization measures,
which has led to an explosion of directives calling for uniform policies for waste, chemi-
cals, and other measures (discussed by McCormick, 2001). Such clauses appear puzzling.
While economists recognize the need to coordinate policies when there are externalities,
the first-best policy ought to reflect local conditions. By allowing our two regions ne-
gotiate unconstrained, the region with the highest value of clean air must clean most in
equilibrium. Although this outcome is due to the diﬀerence in bargaining power, it is
beneficial that most cleaning is located where it is mostly appreciated. But negotiations
may be costly when there is private information. By giving in early, a region reveals a
high willingness to pay for the agreement, and it must thus bear the lion’s share of the
cost. Thus, to get a more favorably deal, the regions may want to signal reluctance to
1For a survey, see Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002).
2The mechanism design approach to this problem, initiated by Myerson and Sattertwhite (1983)
excludes unreasonable outcomes and picks the best alternative in the remaining set. Although useful in
providing upper bounds to what is achievable, the best mechanism typically hinges on the players’ beliefs
in complex ways, and it requires considerable commitment. The alternative approach, pursued in this
paper, is to explicitly analyze negotiations and investigate how the outcome depends on the bargaining
agenda.
3In this respect, the bargaining game is similar to those suggested by Admati and Perry (1987) and
Cramton (1992), as is the equilibrium I consider.
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participate by strategic delay.4 A commitment to uniform policies, on the other hand,
reduces the conflict of interest between the regions. Since the regions will have to make
equal contributions to an agreement in any case, they do not find it worthwhile to signal
bargaining power by delay. To judge whether the policy should be diﬀerentiated instead
of uniform across regions, the gains from diﬀerentiation should be compared to the in-
creased cost of delay. Proposition 1 shows how the optimal bargaining agenda depends
on the expected value of an agreement, the amount of externality and heterogeneity.
While the above case is a nice benchmark case, it is typically presumed that allowing
for side payments increases eﬃciency. If the regions are closely integrated, issue linkages
and logrolling will be intrinsic in the political debate. It is then realistic to let the regions
negotiate over side payments in addition to the policy. The policy will then typically be
optimally diﬀerentiated in equilibrium, since the region contributing less can compensate
the one contributing more. To exploit these gains from trade, it is always better to allow
policy diﬀerentiation (Proposition 2). However, Proposition 3 describes when it is even
better to prohibit both side payments and diﬀerentiation, as this reduces the the conflict
of interests, and thus delay.
Bargaining agendas:
Diﬀerentiation?
Side payments?
no yes
no x d, x
yes s, x d, s, x
Are side payments good? Having analyzed the outcome with and without side pay-
ments (by horizontal comparisons in the above table), it is constructive to compare the
two cases (by a vertical comparison) to examine the isolated impact of side payments.
Side payments can typically be facilitated by logrolling, issue linkages and giving the
negotiators discretion over several political issues. Whether it is desirable to introduce
side payments in this way is thus an important question.5 By allowing side payments,
any action increasing total utility can be implemented as a Pareto improvement by mak-
ing the winner compensate the loser. It is therefore a common presumption that side
payments are needed to reach the best result (Cesar and de Zeeuw, 1996, p. 158). The
existing literature on issue linkages (see e.g. Inderst, 2000) emphasizes such gains from
trade indeed, but it also detects distributive eﬀects. The present paper contributes to
this debate. On the one hand, another rationale for side payments is presented. When
4This is related to "why stabilization is delayed". Alesina and Drazen (1991) study a war of attrition
between legislators trying to stabilize the economy. The proposal-maker must bear the lion’s share of
the stabilization cost. Hsieh (2000) endogenizes this assumption: accepting early stabilization reveals a
politician’s willingness to pay. Another politician can therefore safely require that the first bears most
of the stabilization cost. Anticipating this, every politician is reluctant to propose stabilization, and
stabilization is delayed.
5Negotiations in the European Council (consisting of the heads of states who have a lot of discretion
over alternative political issues) are likely to involve issue linkages and thus side payments. Side payments
are less likely to be possible for issues determined by the Council of Ministers, where the various ministers
lack discretion over other policies. Since the European Union’s decision-making procedures are currently
under debate, and since countries generally disagree on the extent of issue linkages, it is both important
and timely to ask whether side payments should be desired.
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the regions negotiate over side payments as well as the policy, a region can signal its type
by the combination it suggests. Signaling by the proposed direction of trade can thus re-
place costly delay as a signaling device. On the other hand, the distributive eﬀect of side
payments may increase the conflict of interest between regions. Without side payments, a
reluctant region is likely to contribute less to the agreement; with side payments, it may
even be able to acquire transfers from the other region. If so, bargaining power pays oﬀ
more, and the incentive to signal reluctance increases when side payments are possible.
For side payments to be beneficial, the gains from trade must be larger that the increased
cost of delay. Depending on the expected value of the agreement, the externality and the
heterogeneity, Proposition 4 presents conditions under which introducing side payments
is actually bad.
The results of this paper describe the optimal bargaining agenda. In the model, policy
diﬀerentiation and side payments will always be included unless regions are able to commit
to the optimal agenda in advance (before they know their own types). The necessity to
commit ties this paper to the literature on fiscal federalism (surveyed by Oates, 1999) in
two interesting ways. To some extent, frequent interaction facilitates the possibilities to
commit, since sticking to the optimal agenda today is motivated by cooperation tomorrow.
In other cases, it is necessary to commit by writing a more formal constitution. For either
reason, regions in a federal union should be better able to commit to uniform policies
when this is optimal. Thus, the theory predicts more uniform policies within than across
federal unions. This is exactly the critical "uniformity assumption" made in the federalism
literature,6 which often is criticized for being ad hoc.7 The analysis in this paper provides
a microeconomic foundation for the uniformity assumption, and characterizes when it is
likely to hold.
Suppose that we rely on the assumption that centralization implies uniform policies.
Centralizing the policy is then a certain way of committing to uniform policies. The
comparison between uniform and diﬀerentiated policies becomes identical to the compar-
ison between centralization (requiring uniform policies) and decentralization (where the
6Oates (1972) initiated an entire literature based on this assumption. Recently, Alesina and Spoalore
(1997) have analyzed the optimal and equilibrium size of nations when the benefit of a large size is
increasing returns to scale, while the cost is that the policy must be uniform across heterogeneous regions.
Bolton and Roland (1997) investigate the breakup of nations under similar assumptions, while Ellingsen
(1998) studies political integration. In his survey over the fiscal federalism literature, Oates (1999, p.
1130) states that There is clearly some kind of trade-oﬀ here between internalizing spillover benefits (and
costs) and allowing local diﬀerentiation.
7Lockwood (2002) claims that the uniformity assumption is not derived from any explicit model of
government behavior, and Besley and Coate (2003) therefore declare that Oates’ analysis is suspect. There
are some papers, however, suggesting how the political game may induce uniformity. Cremer and Palfrey
(2000) show how a majority might vote for a federal mandate, i.e. a minimum level for local policies,
which might be too strict. The reason is that voters unaﬀected by the mandate (sincerely) vote together
with those benefiting from a stricter mandate. Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) argue that a uniform
tariﬀ across industries might be optimal to reduce lobbying and tie the hands of politicians favoring
certain groups. By similar arguments, Besharov (2002) shows that uniform policies may be optimal to
avoid costly lobbying. It is less clear why uniformity should result from asymmetric information. In a
situation with private information, Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001) show that it is still optimal
to diﬀerentiate regional transfers even if this requires that the region with the lowest tax base must signal
this by an ineﬃciently large tax rate.
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negotiating regions are free to propose diﬀerentiation and perhaps side payments). Thus,
Proposition 1-4 may be interpreted as conditions for when centralization outperforms de-
centralization.8 Traditionally, the fiscal federalism literature evaluates decentralization
vs. centralization assuming that if the policy is decentralized, there will be no political
coordination. However, even if the policy is decentralized, the regions certainly have in-
centives to negotiate whenever externalities exist. It is therefore reasonable to relax this
assumption, as is done in this paper. While some of the traditional insights are confirmed,
others are turned upside-down.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section models the economy and the bargaining
game in a context without side payments. The following section describes the equilibrium
and its properties, and discusses circumstances under which a uniform policy is better
than a diﬀerentiated one. Section 4 repeats this exercise with side payments, while Section
5 compares the two cases and derives conditions under which side payments should be
prohibited. The alternative interpretations of the results are discussed in the concluding
section. All proofs are found in the Appendix.
2. The Model
2.1. The Environment
Two regions, A and B, consider whether to undertake a joint public project and, if so,
how its total cost of 1 should be distributed between them. To fix ideas, suppose A and
B suﬀer from a symmetric regional environmental problem. A fraction e of A’s emission
crosses the border and pollutes region B, while a fraction 1− e remains as local pollution
in region A. A’s value of clean air is vA, but there is a unit cost to clean or reduce
emission. Let xA denote the amount A cleans or reduces emission. Making symmetric
assumptions for region B, the regional (von Neumann-Morgenstern) utilities are
uA = [(1− e)xA + exB] vA − xA (2.1)
uB = [(1− e)xB + exA] vB − xB.
A region pays the entire cost of its cleaning, while it only receives a fraction (1− e) of the
benefit. Since the other region enjoys the remaining fraction e, each region prefers the
other region to clean as much as possible. If e = 1/2, cleaning is a pure public good.
Assume that a region will clean nothing unless an agreement is formed, because vi(1−
e) < 1.9 so that it is not in the interest of one region to clean alone. Relative to this default
outcome, the regions are considering a joint public project that will reduce total emission
by one unit, i.e. xA + xB = 1. xA is therefore A’s contribution to the public project. A
uniform policy requires that both regions have the same environmental standard, or that
they both reduce emission by the same amount. In either case, this implies that xA = xB.
8This tradeoﬀ is quite similar to that analyzed by Bolton and Farrell (1990). They study firms’ entry
into a market. While the cost of decentralizing this decision might be delay (as well as duplication when
both firms enter), the benefit is that the most eﬃcient firm is likely to enter first. A clumsy government,
in contrast, will immediately but randomly select one firm.
9In statements that may be true for either region, I let i denote any of these, i.e. i ∈ {A,B}.
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Assume that vi > 1, such that both regions benefit from a uniform agreement relative to
no agreement.10 If the policy is not uniform, the amount of diﬀerentiation is defined as
d ≡ xB − xA.
There are potential benefits from diﬀerentiating the policy if the regions are heterogeneous
(vA 6= vB). This can be seen from rewriting (2.1) as
uA =
1
2
[vA − 1] +
1
2
[1− (1− 2e)vA]d (2.2)
uB =
1
2
[vB − 1]−
1
2
[1− (1− 2e)vB]d
and defining total welfare as
u ≡ uA + uB =
1
2
(vA + vB)− 1 +
µ
1
2
− e
¶
(vB − vA) d. (2.3)
If e < 1/2, pollution is mainly a local problem, and d > 0 is eﬃcient if and only if
vB > vA: it is eﬃcient that the region with the highest value of clean air reduces its
emission most. If e = 1/2, however, cleaning is a pure public good and there is no value
from diﬀerentiating the policy. If e > 1/2 (e.g. due to the plants’ strategic location),
most of the emission crosses the border, and d < 0 is eﬃcient if and only if vB > vA: it is
optimal that the region with the lowest value of clean air reduces its emission most.
However, A and B have conflicting interests in how the policy should be diﬀerentiated.
Each region prefers that the other region contributes most, and the regional contributions
are determined by the negotiations. These negotiations are complex since local preferences
are local information.11 Each region i knows only its own type vi ∈ {v, v}, and the fact
that the other region’s type is either v or v > v with equal probability.12
2.2. A Bargaining Model
In the above environment, regions A and B try to make an agreement. This subsection
suggests a bargaining game describing their negotiations. Naturally, this bargaining game
10I thus abstract from the issue of participation. If vi < 1 were possible, diﬀerentiation or side payments
would be necessary to encourage i to participate, which would certainly reduce the case for uniform policies
(see e.g. Hoel, 1992).
11This is a standard assumption in the fiscal federalism literature, and it is also empirically plausible.
For example, in a discussion of European environmental policies, Mäler (1991) observes that the control
costs and environmental damage in one country are known to that country only.
12The model can be interpreted and modified in several alternative ways. First, instead of negotiating
the allocation of costs, regions may negotiate how to share a cake. The utility function above can be
rewritten as uA = (1 + evA)xB + (1 − e)vAxA − 1. Let the regional cost of the cake be fixed and
equal to one for each region; xB be A’s share of the cake; xA be B’s share. The externality (from cake
consumption) should now be interpreted as 1 − e, instead of e as before. Otherwise, the results will be
the same.
Second, instead of heterogeneity related to values, the heterogeneity might be related to costs. This
requires me to slightly rewrite the model, although the analysis and the trade-oﬀs would be similar.
Third, allowing for observed heterogeneity in addition to the unobservable heterogeneity above is
straightforward. A’s type could either be vA or vA, while B’s type could be vB or vB. Were the
observable heterogeneity larger, a diﬀerentiated policy would be more likely to be better.
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should only be interpreted as an example since the regions may negotiate diﬀerently. Nev-
ertheless, the following procedure is useful because (i) it implements the most eﬃcient
"stable" and "robust" mechanism (defined in the next section), and (ii) it provides intu-
ition for how implementation is achieved.
The bargaining game is quite standard. The regions make alternating oﬀers over d,
A makes the first oﬀer, time is continuous and the time horizon is infinite. An early
agreement is preferred to a later one, since i’s present value of an agreement settled at
time t is δtuA, where δ < 1 is the regions’ common discount factor. The minimum time
between oﬀers is arbitrarily small (and approaching zero). However, I relax the standard
assumption that a region must make a proposal at a certain time. Each region is allowed
to delay as long as it wishes before making an oﬀer. This provides a way for the regions to
signal their types. In this respect, the game is similar to the seller-buyer bargaining games
proposed by Admati and Perry (1987) and Cramton (1992), as is the equilibrium. Admati
and Perry find a unique sequential equilibrium when the seller’s type is known, while the
buyer’s type is either high or low. Cramton describes an equilibrium in a symmetric game
with two-sided private information, and where the distribution of types is continuous.13
3. Uniform or Diﬀerent Policies?
The first subsection describes a sequential equilibrium outcome when the policy can be
diﬀerentiated. Although the equilibrium is not unique, the next subsection presents some
of its attractive features, which justify why I let this outcome represent the case with
diﬀerentiation. The third subsection compares this outcome to the outcome when policies
must be uniform, and derives Proposition 1.
3.1. The Outcome with Diﬀerentiation
Suppose that both regions’ types were common knowledge. The above bargaining game
would then have the same unique equilibrium as in the standard Rubinstein (1982) bar-
gaining game. The amount of diﬀerentiation would be given by dR, defined as
dR: B’s type (3.1)
A’s type
v v
v 0 d0
v −d0 0
13In this paper, as in most of the literature on bargaining with private information, bargaining power
is signaled by costly delay. Alternatively, bargaining power may be signaled by proposing a suboptimal
or an incomplete agreement. In fact, all results in this paper continue to hold if, instead of delaying
to t, each region can credibly reduce the total amount of cleaning in the relevant agreement from 1 to
δt. Instead of delaying, a low-type region would then signal its bargaining power by proposing a less
ambitious project.
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where14
d0 ≡ 1
2
·
v − 1
1− v(1− 2e) −
v − 1
1− v(1− 2e)
¸
. (3.2)
If B has a high value of clean air, B is very eager to settle the agreement quickly. Since
eagerness reduces the bargaining power, a low-type A forces B to contribute most to the
agreement, so then d = d0 > 0.
When local preferences are local information, the final agreement will still be the one
determined by (3.1), but only after each low-type region has credibly signaled its type by
a suﬃcient delay. The outcome will be the following. Suppose A is of high type. Then,
A immediately proposes that the two regions should make equal contributions (d = 0).
A high-type B immediately accepts. A low-type B, however, rejects A’s oﬀer and delays
until time t1 before suggesting (by proposing −d0) that A contributes most. This is
immediately accepted by A. Suppose instead A is of low type. Then, A does not make
any immediate oﬀer. Instead, A delays until t1 before suggesting (by proposing d0) that
B contributes most. A high-type B immediately accepts. A low-type B, however, rejects
A’s oﬀer and delays until t2 before suggesting that they make equal contributions (d = 0),
which A immediately accepts.
When a region accepts an oﬀer dR, it does so because it is convinced that the other
region is of a certain type. Each delay is exactly suﬃciently long to credibly signal that
the region is of a low type. A high-type region is less patient, and cannot aﬀord such
a delay. The low-type region therefore separates itself from the high-type, by taking an
action (delay) that the other type cannot aﬀord.15 This requires that
delay: B’s type (3.3)
A’s type
v v
v t2 t1
v t1 0
14Note that an aﬃne transformation of the utilities gives
euA ≡ uA1
2 [1− vA(1− 2e)]
= wA + d
euB ≡ uB1
2 [1− vB(1− 2e)]
= wB − d,
where
wi ≡
vi − 1
1− vi(1− 2e)
is region i’s willingness to pay for the agreement in terms of d. In the Rubinstein (1982) alternating
oﬀer bargaining game, as the time between oﬀers approaches zero, d will be set such that euA and euB are
equalized:
dR =
wB − wA
2
,
which gives (3.1). This will still be the equilibrium when regions have the possibility to delay the
agreement, since no region could benefit from a delay.
15This is possible since the utility function δtui fulfills the single-crossing property.
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where
δt1 = 1−
·
(1− v(1− 2e))d0
v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))d0
¸
(3.4)
δt2 = 1− 2
·
(1− v(1− 2e))d0
v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))d0
¸
.
3.2. Equilibrium Properties
While the previous subsection merely described the equilibrium outcome, this subsection
characterizes some of its properties and justifies the attention it will be paid.
As stated by the following Lemma 1, the above outcome can be supported as a sequen-
tial equilibrium. Moreover, it is the unique equilibrium if we apply a certain optimistic
intuitive criterion to refine the set of equilibria. No pooling equilibria then exist.16 In
addition, the above outcome has several attractive properties. It is symmetric, and there
is no first-mover advantage. Since only low-type regions delay, an agreement is settled
earlier if it is more valuable. And when the regions finally settle the agreement, they
do so at "fair" terms, i.e. according to the Rubinstein outcome (3.1). This feature is of
particular importance in our context. It is widely agreed that international negotiations
must be self-enforcing, since external enforcement mechanisms are seldom available. After
an agreement has been formed, A can leave the agreement with the only consequence that
the agreement breaks down.17 If A does so, the two regions have incentives to renegotiate
a new agreement. If, at this point in time, A’s and B’s types are revealed, they imme-
diately agree on the Rubinstein bargaining outcome (3.1). Anticipating this, no other
agreement than (3.1) is robust for such a unilateral request to renegotiate. Thus, it is
reasonable to require d = dR to make self-enforcing agreements renegotiation-proof.
Definition 1: An agreement d is stable if and only if d = dR.
To fully evaluate the above equilibrium outcome, however, we should ask what else
could be achieved. Notwithstanding how the regions solve their problem, their method
could be substituted by a mechanism where honest revelation is an equilibrium. In our
context, we can define a mechanism in the following way:
Definition 2: Let bv = {v, v} be each player’s strategy set. A mechanism is a mapping
M : bv2 → R×R+, which determines an outcome (d, t) for each pair of possible types the
regions may announce.18
Unrestricted mechanism design is often criticized as requiring too much of the insti-
tutional environment. First, the optimal mechanism typically implies ex post suboptimal
16The definitions and discussions of these concepts are relegated to the Appendix, to separate the
theoretically inclined reader from the more applied one.
17Barrett (2001) writes that the rules for international law allow countries to withdraw from an inter-
national treaty, at least after giving suﬃcient notice; and, as to reaﬃrm this freedom, nearly all treaties
include an explicit provision for withdrawal.
18There is no loss of generality by letting the mechanism be deterministic. Instead of letting the
mechanism specify a probability p for the agreement to be formed, it can simply let the agreement be
formed at date t, where δt = p.
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outcomes. If, however, the agreement must be self-enforcing, as argued above, then the
mechanism should be restricted to outcomes that are ex post stable. I will say that a
mechanism M is stable if d = dR whenever the regions announce their true types.
Second, the optimal mechanism typically requires the regions to simultaneously an-
nounce their types, thereby preventing the behavior of one from depending on that of
the other. This is not how regions solve problems in practice, however. In negotiations,
as the one described above, regions reveal their types sequentially, and perhaps little by
little. While a region might be uncertain about its opponent’s value before making an
oﬀer, the opponent’s value might just as well have been revealed. Moreover, in reality,
it is hard to separate exactly what is private information, and what regions know about
each other (perhaps by espionage). A mechanism only working whenever types are private
information, does not seem very appealing. In contrast, I will define a robust mechanism
to be one that works even if a region should be aware of the other region’s type.
Definition 3: A mechanism M is robust if it is incentive compatible, whether or not one
region knows the other region’s type.19
If mechanisms must be stable and robust, then the regions can actually not do better
than in the equilibrium outcome described above.
Lemma 1: (i) Equations (3.1)-(3.4) characterize a sequential equilibrium outcome, (ii)
which is unique under the optimistic intuitive criterion. Moreover, (iii) it implements the
most eﬃcient stable robust mechanism.20
3.3. When is Uniformity Better?
Suppose that before knowing their own types, the two regions anticipate the above out-
come. Since each region may be of low or high type with equal probability, their total
expected utility can be written as
ud =
1
4
(v − 1) + 1
2
·
v + v
2
− 1 +
µ
1
2
− e
¶
(v − v) d0
¸
δt1 +
1
4
(v − 1)δt2 . (3.5)
Suppose, further, that the two regions would be able to commit to uniform policies
(d = 0) if they ever reached an agreement. Would they make such a commitment? If they
did, the proceeding bargaining outcome would be simple. A would immediately suggest
an agreement, and B would immediately accept, whatever are their types. There would be
no conflict of interest, as they would not have discretion over d. Thus, there would be no
point in signaling reluctance by delay, as there would be no way of exploiting bargaining
19This implies that a robust mechanism is incentive compatible for any beliefs that one region may
have about the other region’s type.
20How restrictive are the requirements that the mechanism must be stable and robust? By relaxing
the first of these, and assuming that e < 1/2, the best separating mechanism implies that d0 is as large as
possible, while the delays are still given by (3.3). The following result (Proposition 1) is not altered. If
relaxing the second requirement, the best mechanism dictates no delay if only one region announces low
type, but a longer delay if both do. But if e ≥ 1/2, no mechanism can do better than a uniform policy.
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power.21 The total expected utility would be
u0 =
1
4
(v − 1) + 1
2
µ
v + v
2
− 1
¶
+
1
4
(v − 1). (3.6)
By comparison, diﬀerentiation provides costs as well as benefits. The potential benefit
is that the region with the highest value of clean air will reduce its emission most, the
cost is that such an agreement only occurs with some delay. Such delays are necessary
for a low-type region to credibly signal its type which, in turn, is necessary to make the
other region accept a larger contribution.
Define the expected value of clean air as
v ≡ v + v
2
,
and the heterogeneity by the relative diﬀerence in the two types’ net value of a uniform
agreement:
h ≡ v − 1
v − 1 > 1.
It turns out that a uniform policy is better whenever
h
·
2(v − 1)
µ
1− 2e
e
¶
− 1
¸
≤ 3, (3.7)
that is, when the externality is large while the heterogeneity and the expected value of
the agreement are low. The basic intuition for this is the following. If the externality e is
low, it is beneficial that the high-type region cleans most, since this will imply that the
air is cleanest where this is most appreciated. Thus, the diﬀerentiation following from the
bargaining game is valuable. If e ≈ 1/2, however, cleaning is (almost) a pure public good
and it is of no importance where it is located, since the cost is the same in both regions.
The value of diﬀerentiation is then low. If e > 1/2, it would be optimal that the low-type
region contributed most. In equilibrium, however, the high-type region contributes most,
since it has the lowest bargaining power. Allowing for diﬀerentiation would then clearly
be perverse. Thus, the benefit from a diﬀerentiated policy decreases when e becomes
larger. The cost, it turns out, increases. As e increases, each region benefits more from
the other region’s contribution, and the high type becomes more tempted to imitate the
low-type’s strategy. To credibly signal bargaining power, delay must increase. In sum: if
e increases, the cost of diﬀerentiation increases while the benefit decreases, and a uniform
policy becomes better.
Suppose that e ≤ 1/2. If v increases, there is an increase in the gains from cleaning
at home. The value of convincing the other region to contribute more, (1− (1− 2e) vi),
decreases. In particular, the high-type region becomes less tempted to delay for the only
21If utilities were concave in xi, however, diﬀerent types would prefer diﬀerent levels of cleaning, even
if the contributions were bound to be equal in both regions. In that case, it would still be a conflict of
interest between the regions under uniform policies. If the utility functions were not extremely concave,
however, the conflict of interest would be even larger if diﬀerentiation were allowed, which would increase
the delay.
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purpose of contributing less. Thus, delay decreases, and diﬀerentiation is more likely to
be best. If e > 1/2, however, most of the domestic pollution comes from the other region.
Then, it becomes more important that the other region does most of the cleaning, which
makes it more tempting to signal bargaining power, and there is an increase in delay. This
makes a uniform policy even more superior.
If the heterogeneity h increases, the value of diﬀerentiation increases directly, which
makes a diﬀerentiated policy better relative to a uniform one.
It should be noticed that the discount factor δ aﬀects neither the cost nor the benefit
of diﬀerentiation. If δ decreases, delay becomes more costly, but there is a corresponding
decrease in the delay required to credibly signal reluctance. The cost of delay remains the
same. The benefit of diﬀerentiation comes closer in time, but its present value remains
constant.
The above discussion is not complete, however. If e, h, or v changes, so does the
amount of diﬀerentiation d0. And when d0 changes, so do both the cost and the benefit of
diﬀerentiation. If d0 increases, for example, the amount of diﬀerentiation increases, and
thus also the potential benefit. But a larger d0 makes the high-type more tempted to
imitate the low-type, and to credibly signal bargaining power, delay must increase. The
proof of Proposition 1 shows that costs and benefits increase similarly when d0 increases,
and the two eﬀects cancel.
In reality, d0 may not be determined by negotiations alone. Economic or technological
constraints may limit to what extent the policy can be diﬀerentiated, such that d ∈
[−D,D] for some D ≥ 0. If this constraint were binding, i.e. if d0 > D, it is easily shown
that the outcome (3.1)-(3.4) continues to describe the equilibrium if just d0 is replaced by
D. As argued above, the amount of diﬀerentiation (d0 or D) does not aﬀect whether a
uniform policy is better. The following proposition holds in any case.22 ,23
Proposition 1: u0 ≥ ud if and only if condition (3.7) holds. This is more likely if the
externality e is large, the heterogeneity h small, and the value v low.
Some policies call for more harmonization than others. For the European Union, for
example, it is enlightening to compare Articles 100a and 130s in the Single European Act.
While the latter Article applies to environmental issues in general, the former encourages
harmonization measures particularly for policies aﬀecting the internal market, where the
externality is likely to be larger. Interestingly, derogation (policy diﬀerentiation) is not
possible under Article 100a, while it is under Article 130s. Moreover, uniform policies are
easier to implement under Article 100a, since this requires a qualified majority only, as
opposed to the unanimity required by Article 130s. Both diﬀerences seem to be in line
with Proposition 1.
22A careful reader may suggest that D = 1, since d > 1 would imply that A increases its emission by
signing the agreement. But some types of policy are easier to diﬀerentiate than others, and since there
exist contexts where both D < 1 and D > 1 might be reasonable, I do not specify a value for D.
23The above analysis is restricted to the comparison between zero diﬀerentiation and equilibrium level
of diﬀerentiation. Could an interior solution be optimal, making D endogenous? The answer is no. If
d0 were replaced by D, it can be shown that there is some optimal value D∗ maximizing ud. However,
unless (3.7) holds, D∗ > d0, such that it would never be optimal to restrict D below d0.
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Figure 4.1: The static Pareto frontier when the agenda is (d, s), e < 1/2, A is of high
type and B is of low type. R indicates the outcome if information is symmetric.
4. Introducing Side Payments
-Side payments may not be relevant if we consider coordination in a single issue. But they
may be highly relevant when the coordinating countries are integrated also in other areas
of policy, as in Europe today (Persson and Tabellini, 1995, p. 2000). As issue linkages
and logrolling become intrinsic in the political debate, side payments can be included
and perhaps not excluded from the bargaining agenda. Moreover, economists typically
presume that side payments improve the eﬃciency of negotiations. For these reasons, I
now introduce s as a (possible negative) side payment from B to A. Transaction costs
related to such side payments are assumed to be negligible. We can then rewrite (2.2) as
uA =
1
2
[vA − 1] +
1
2
[1− vA(1− 2e)]d+ s (4.1)
uB =
1
2
[vB − 1]−
1
2
[1− vB(1− 2e)]d− s.
The bargaining game is similar to that above, but now, each proposal is a pair (d, s). The
static Pareto frontier is drawn in Figure 4.1.
4.1. The Outcome with Side Payments and Diﬀerentiation
If information were complete, the bargaining outcome would be an immediate agreement
where d ∈ [−D,D] would maximize the sum of the utilities while s would be set so as
to equalize A’s and B’s utilities.24 If vA = vB, the bargaining outcome (d, s) would be
24This can simply be shown by using arguments similar to Rubinstein (1982).
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(0, 0).25 Otherwise (d, s) are given by
(vA, vB) = (v, v) (vA, vB) = (v, v)
e ≤ 1/2 (D, s) (−D,−s)
e > 1/2 (−D, s) (D,−s)
(4.2)
where
s ≡ 1
4
(v − v)− D
4
[2− (v + v)(1− 2e)]
s ≡ 1
4
(v − v) + D
4
[2− (v + v)(1− 2e)].
If the regional contributions were equal, side payments would go from the high-type
region to the low-type region, since the former benefits more from an agreement than the
latter. But if one region contributes more than the other, it must be compensated. The
net side payment will consist of the sum of these two forces. If e < 1/2, most of the
pollution is local and it is optimal that the high-type region cleans as much as possible.
The two forces then pull in opposing directions, and it is unclear whether the side payment
s that equalizes utilities is positive or negative. If e > 1/2, however, most of the emission
crosses the border and it is optimal that the low type cleans most. The side payment
to the low type is then s > s, and is clearly positive. If pollution is a pure public good
(e = 1/2), it is of no importance where cleaning takes place, as long as the side payment
equalizes utilities.
When local preferences are local information, the final agreement will still be that
determined by (4.2), but only after each low-type region has credibly signaled its type.
The outcome will be the following. Suppose e ≤ 1/2. If region A is of high type, it
proposes (d, s) = (0, 0) at t = 0. A high-type B immediately accepts. A low-type B
rejects A’s oﬀer and delays to ts1 before it counteroﬀers (−D,−s), which A accepts. If
region A is of low type, it does not make any immediate oﬀer. Instead, A delays to
ts1 before proposing (D, s). A high-type B immediately accepts. A low-type B rejects
A’s oﬀer and delays to ts2 before it counteroﬀers (0, 0), which A immediately accepts.
If e > 1/2, the game is similar, but now a low-type region suggests contributing most
(against the compensation s > s), because this gives the largest total utility.
When a region accepts an oﬀer, it does so because it is convinced that the other region
is of a certain type. Each delay is exactly suﬃciently long to credibly signal that the region
is of a low type. A high-type region finds the low-type region’s strategy unattractive, for
two reasons. First, a high-type region is less patient, it cannot aﬀord such a delay. Second,
a low-type region pays the other region to contribute most (or least, if e > 1/2). A high-
type region, in contrast, would benefit from the opposite agreement. The regions are
exploiting "gains from trade" by allocating cleaning where it is most valuable. A region
can thus signal its type by proposing a certain direction of trade.26 If D |1− 2e| is large,
the gains from optimal diﬀerentiation are large, the high-type is little tempted to imitate
25If regions were of the same type, and if transaction costs were identical to zero, the choice of d would
be of no importance as long as s is such that the utilities are equal. A small but negligible transaction
cost would make s = d = 0 the strictly better agreement, however.
26That a player can signal its type by the proposed direction of trade is related to the result by Cramton,
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the low-type, and the necessary delay to separate the two types decreases. In fact, if
D |1− 2e| ≥ 1, proposing a direction of trade is a suﬃcient signal: delay is not necessary
and the bargaining outcome is first best. If D |1− 2e| < 1, however, it is necessary with
the following
delay: B’s type
A’s type
v v
v ts2 t
s
1
v ts1 0
where
δt
s
1 = 1−
·
(v − v) (1− |1− 2e|D)
2(v − 1) + (v − v) (1− |1− 2e|D)
¸
(4.3)
δt
s
2 = 1− 2
·
(v − v) (1− |1− 2e|D)
2(v − 1) + (v − v) (1− |1− 2e|D)
¸
.
4.2. Equilibrium Properties
As stated by Lemma 2, the above outcome can be supported as a sequential equilibrium.
In addition, it has similar features to the case without side payments; it is symmetric, and
there is no first-mover advantage. Since only low-type regions may delay, an agreement
is settled earlier if it is more valuable. And when the regions finally settle the agreement,
it is stable, i.e., it coincides with the outcome in (4.2) if information is complete. This
sequential equilibrium is, in fact, unique if we restrict the attention to stable outcomes
and apply the same optimistic intuitive criterion as before.27 Finally, the sequential
equilibrium implements the most eﬃcient stable robust mechanism.28
Lemma 2: (i) Equations (4.2)-(4.3) characterize a sequential equilibrium outcome, (ii)
which is unique under the optimistic intuitive criterion and if we require the outcome to
be stable. Moreover, (iii) it implements the most eﬃcient stable robust mechanism.
4.3. When is Uniformity Better?
When both diﬀerentiation and side payments are on the negotiation table, the total
expected utility can be written as
uds =
1
4
(v − 1) + 1
2
·
v + v
2
− 1 + (v − v)
¯¯¯¯
1
2
− e
¯¯¯¯
D
¸
δt
s
1 +
1
4
(v − 1)δts2. (4.4)
Gibbons and Klemperer (1987) on how to eﬃciently solve a partnership. When the parties have roughly
equal shares, there is confusion about who is going to sell/buy the shares in the partnership, which makes
it easier to encourage a player to reveal its value.
27Definitions of these concepts are found in the Appendix.
28Once more, we can ask how restrictive the stable- and robust-requirements are. By relaxing the first
of these, the best mechanism requires suﬃciently large side payments (from the low-type to the high-type
region) to make imitation unattractive for the high type. This achieves the first-best. If we only relax
the second requirement, the best mechanism dictates no delay if only one region announces low type, but
a longer delay if done by both.
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Figure 4.2: It is optimal to prohibit both diﬀerentiation and side payments, instead of
allowing them both, if and only if the parameters are such that we are in area U .
Suppose the two regions were able to commit to uniform policies (D = 0) should they
ever reach an agreement. Would they make such a commitment? If side payments, but
not diﬀerentiation, are on the bargaining agenda, the outcome is exactly as above if we
set D = 0. Define the resulting total expected utility as us. By inspection, it is clear
that uds increases in D, for two reasons. First, as D increases, it becomes possible to
concentrate more of the cleaning to one region, and the gains from doing this eﬃciently
increases. Second, it becomes more costly for high-type regions to imitate the low-type
region’s strategy, since this would imply ineﬃcient diﬀerentiation. Thus, the need for
delay is smaller. For these two reasons, it is always better to allow policy diﬀerentiation
if side payments are on the agenda.
Proposition 2: uds ≥ us always.
This proposition does not imply that diﬀerentiation is good whenever side payments
can be part of the agenda. It might be beneficial to prohibit both side payments and
diﬀerentiation, that is, u0 ≥ uds. By doing this, delay is ensured to be zero. By allowing
both side payments and diﬀerentiation, however, the policy is diﬀerentiated eﬃciently.
It turns out that it is better to prohibit both side payments and diﬀerentiation when-
ever
h
µ
2
1− |1− 2e|D − 3
¶
≤ 3, (4.5)
that is, when |e− 1/2|, h and D are small. The basic intuition is as follows. If e < 1/2,
in equilibrium, most of the cleaning takes place in the high-value region, and its benefit
is decreasing in e. If e > 1/2, optimal diﬀerentiation implies that the low-type region
does most of the cleaning, and this benefit is increasing in e. In either case, the value
of such diﬀerentiation is increasing in the heterogeneity h and the possible amount of
diﬀerentiation, D. If e ≈ 1/2, however, it is of no importance where cleaning takes place,
and there is little value of diﬀerentiation. The potential cost of diﬀerentiation is delay,
but this is decreasing in the gains from trade D |1− 2e|, since such trade provides an
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eﬃcient signaling device. If D |1− 2e| ≥ 1, there is in fact no delay, and the first-best is
attainable by allowing both diﬀerentiation and side payments.29
Proposition 3: u0 ≥ uds if and only if both D |1− 2e| < 1 and (4.5) hold. This is
more likely if the heterogeneity h is small, the possibilities to diﬀerentiate D is small and
contributions are almost pure public goods, i.e.,
¯¯
1
2
− e
¯¯
is small.
5. Are Side Payments Good?
-Side payments are needed to reach the best result (Cesar and de Zeeuw, 1996, p.158). By
introducing side payments, any outcome raising total welfare can be Pareto improving by
making the winner compensate the loser. It is therefore a common presumption that side
payments increase the eﬃciency of negotiations, and economists are eager to advocate
issue linkages as a way of introducing side payments.30 It is therefore puzzling why side
payments are seldom observed to be an explicit part of international agreements. Cesar
and de Zeeuw conjecture that the reason might be that it is diﬃcult...to determine the
precise willingness to pay.
Suppose that behind a veil of ignorance, the regions were able to prohibit side payments
in future negotiations. Would they? The above analysis makes us well equipped to address
this question. The bargaining outcomes for the relevant cases are already discussed:
Section 3 made a horizontal comparison between the two agendas in the first row of the
table
Diﬀerentiation?
Side payments?
no yes
no x d, x
yes s, x d, s, x
.
Section 4 did a similar comparison between the two agendas in the second row, and
compared agenda (d, s, x) to agenda (x). This section exhausts the model by making a
vertical comparison.
Introducing side payments to the agenda has three eﬀects. First, it allows one region
to compensate the other for contributing more. Such trade is valuable whenever the policy
is suboptimally diﬀerentiated without side payments. Second, a region can signal its type
by the proposed direction of trade. If e < 1/2, it is not very attractive for the high-type
region to imitate the low-type region’s strategy by paying the other region to do most
29It should be noticed that the average value v does not influence this condition. Without side payments,
a larger v makes a region more willing to contribute (when e < 1/2) and less willing to engage in haggling
over d. The utility of a high-type region thus increases relative to a low-type region. Side payments
adjust to nullify this eﬀect.
30E.g. Barrett (2001) writes that side payments can sustain a vastly superior outcome compared to the
agreement without side payments. From a game-theoretic perspective, however, it is not clear whether
side payments are beneficial. Jackson and Wilkie (2003) show that the possibility to commit to side
payments conditional on strategies may induce players to ineﬃciently tilt the equilibrium in their favor.
In the present paper, however, agents are not able to make such a commitment prior to the game, and
side payments would always be first-best if information were perfect. See also Prat and Rustichini (2003).
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of the cleaning. The necessary delay to credibly signal bargaining power is then smaller.
There is, however, also a third eﬀect. Without side payments, a low-type region might
convince the other region to contribute more. If side payments are allowed, the low-type
region may also require transfers from the other region. If so, bargaining power pays oﬀ
even more and it is more attractive to imitate the low-type’s strategy. The incentives to
signal bargaining power increase, and this eﬀect might outweigh the reduced necessity to
signal by delay. The resulting delay can either decrease or increase.31
Suppose e < 1/2. It turns out that side payments are detrimental to total welfare
whenever
h− 1
h+ 1
≥ D
µ
1− v(1− 2e)
v − 1
¶
, (5.1)
that is, when h is large, while D and e are small. The basic intuition is as follows. If
D is large, the gains from trade are large, and proposing a certain direction of trade is a
credible signal of type. Then, side payments are good as they facilitate trade. If D is low,
however, the gains from trade are small, and signaling a certain direction of trade is not
a very convincing signal. At the same time, bargaining power is not very useful without
side payments, since it is not possible to diﬀerentiate the policy to any considerable extent
in any case. Introducing side payments, however, allows the low-type region to force the
high-type region to pay in side payments what it cannot pay in policy. The incentives
to signal bargaining power increase, as does delay. Thus, if D is small, side payments
are bad. In other words, unless the existing conflict between the regions is suﬃciently
large, allowing side payments is detrimental to eﬃciency since it creates a costly conflict
of interest. It follows that excluding side payments is always optimal if the policy must
be uniform, i.e. u0 > us.
If the heterogeneity h is large, there is a great deal of diﬀerentiation d0 even without
side payments, and the gains from trade D − d0 are small. The diﬀerence in bargaining
power, however, is large, and it is quite likely that the low type will get side payments
from the high type. To credibly signal bargaining power, delay must increase when side
payments are possible. In this case, eﬃciency is larger when side payments are prohibited.
If v is large or e is low, regions are more willing to clean domestically, instead of engag-
ing in haggling. A large v makes cleaning more valuable, and a small e makes domestic
cleaning more important. Regions are therefore less tempted to signal bargaining power,
and delay is reduced. Introducing side payments, however, destroys the peace. Once
more, bargaining power becomes valuable. Regions become more attracted to signaling
bargaining power in order to tilt the transfers in their direction, and delay increases.
Thus, side payments are good only if v is small and e is large. If e > 1/2, the policy is
suboptimally diﬀerentiated without side payments. The gains from trade are then larger,
and side payments are more likely to increase eﬃciency.32
31This possibility is noticed by observers. Concerning European cooperation, Héritier (2002, p. 186)
writes that If an issue is perceived as redistributive, the decision process rapidly becomes polarized and
clear-cut conflict lines emerge... Those adversely aﬀected fend of expected costs and signal their rejection
of the proposal.
32It should be noticed that (5.1) is also the condition for when s ≤ 0. Suppose that d0 ≥ D, such that
the constraint d ∈ [−D,D] binds even if side payments are prohibited. Diﬀerentiation is then optimal,
and there are no gains from trade. Allowing side payments is then beneficial if and only if this reduces
18
Proposition 4: Suppose that e ≤ 1/2. ud ≥ uds if and only if (5.1) holds. This is more
likely if the externality e is small, the heterogeneity h large, the value v of the agreement
large, while the possibility to diﬀerentiate D is small.
6. Interpretations
6.1. International Cooperation
This paper has studied two regions (or countries) trying to coordinate their policies so as
to internalize externalities. While policy diﬀerentiation is necessary to tie local policies
to local conditions, it increases the conflict of interests between the countries, and thus
delay when bargaining power is private information. While side payments create gains
from trade as well as an eﬃcient signaling device, they may also increase the conflict
of interest between the countries, and thus delay. The results described how the best
bargaining agenda hinges on the value of an agreement, the externality, the heterogeneity,
and the possibilities to diﬀerentiate.
The results can be interpreted in several ways. On the positive side, the findings may
explain why side payments not always are observed as an explicit part of international
agreements,33 and why federal policies are characterized by uniform policies.34 On the
normative side, the results describe when such harmonization clauses are a good idea, and
when it is eﬃcient to allow for issue linkages (e.g. by letting the issue be determined in
the European Council, instead of the Council of Ministers that has less discretion). To
implement the optimal bargaining agenda, however, a commitment is required in advance,
which provides additional interpretations.
6.2. Decentralization vs. Centralization
The above arguments are closely related to the literature on fiscal federalism (surveyed
by Oates, 1999). This literature typically compares decentralization vs. centralization of
a political instrument under two assumptions. First, the policy is uniform whenever the
instrument is centralized. Relying on this assumption, centralization should be a certain
way of committing to uniformity. Second, there is no coordination between regions if
the policy is decentralized. However, even if the policy is decentralized, the regions have
incentives to cooperate whenever externalities exist. According to the Coase Theorem,
they will also be quite successful in doing so. If we thus relax the second assumption,
the case for decentralization coincides with the case for diﬀerentiation analyzed above. If
delay. Delay is reduced if and only if it becomes less tempting for the high type to imitate the low type’s
strategy. Whether the high type is more or less tempted to imitate the low type depends on whether
it will receive or pay side payments. If the high-type region will be compensated for contributing more
in equilibrium, then the high type is better oﬀ by allowing side payments, and delay is less necessary to
make the low type’s strategy unattractive for the high type. If, instead, in equilibrium, the high-type
region will pay the low-type region, the high-type region is worse oﬀ when side payments are allowed, and
it becomes more tempting to imitate the low type’s strategy. Then, more delay is necessary to credibly
signal bargaining power.
33This is questioned by e.g. Cesar and de Zeeuw (1996).
34Documented by e.g. McCormick (2001).
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the policy is decentralized, regions coordinate and diﬀerentiate the policy whenever they
are heterogeneous. These regional negotiations are likely to be ineﬃcient and delayed,
however. Centralizing the policy, instead, gives a clumsy central government no other
choice than to implement uniform policies across the regions. While this certainly has
a cost when regions diﬀer, the benefit is less delay. Propositions 1 and 3 show that
centralization is better if heterogeneity is low and the externality large. While this is
in line with the traditional literature, the results also provide new recommendations.
Proposition 1 shows that diﬀerentiation is better when the value of an agreement is large,
because delay is then smaller. Hence, more important decisions should be decentralized.
Moreover, in contrast to the earlier literature, I find that it is the existence of asymmetric
information which makes the case for centralization. With complete information, it is
always better to diﬀerentiate the policy, and thus allow decentralized coordination. With
asymmetric information, instead, decentralized coordination is likely to be ineﬃcient and
centralization may be better. Finally, the central government’s uniform policies do not
constitute a disadvantage, calling for more decentralization (as normally argued). In
contrast, it is the uniform policy which makes centralization potentially attractive, since
it reduces the transaction costs.
The analysis also suggests a case for partial decentralization. Comparing Propositions
1 and 4, a diﬀerentiated policy might be better than a uniform one, but side payments
may still be a bad idea. This will typically be the case if heterogeneity is large while there
is a limit to how much it is possible to diﬀerentiate the policy. The best political regime is
then to decentralize the relevant policy while restricting the regions’ discretion over side
payments.
6.3. Integration and Uniformity
As described by Propositions 1-4, regions may benefit if negotiating uniform instead of
diﬀerentiated policies. As noticed, however, this requires commitment. Without commit-
ment, a reluctant region can easily propose diﬀerentiation and perhaps side payments.
One way of committing is to use trigger strategies in frequent interaction, where regions
stick to the restricted bargaining agenda (without diﬀerentiation or side payments) if this
facilitates future cooperation. Another way of committing is to write formal agreements,
calling for harmonized policies. For either reason, regions constituting a federal union
should be better able to commit to a restricted agenda when this is the best solution.
Hence, we should observe more uniform policies between regions forming a federal union
than between regions that do not. This is exactly the first assumption, mentioned above,
made by the traditional literature on fiscal federalism. The above analysis thus provides
a theoretical foundation for this, and characterizes when the uniformity assumption is
likely to hold. According to this argument, however, this uniformity is not a necessary
shortcoming due to the central government’s inability to diﬀerentiate, as claimed by the
fiscal federalism literature. In contrast, the uniformity is a benefit arising as the federal
union makes the regions better able to commit.
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6.4. Status Quo Bias
Quite often, constitutional rules make renegotiation costly. A justification for such status-
quo bias is provided by the analysis of this paper. In fact, a commitment to uniform
policies may be interpreted as a commitment to stick to an agreement settled behind a
veil of ignorance. One certain way of committing is to create obstacles to renegotiations.
While the cost of this is that the policy cannot be optimally diﬀerentiated ex post, once
the types are realized, the benefit is that regions will not undertake distorting signaling
and screening to tilt the agreement to their advantage. Even if regions were allowed to
renegotiate the allocation of contributions, a status quo bias on other political issues may
eﬀectively prevent the introduction of side payments. Thus, Propositions 1-4 above can
alternatively be interpreted as conditions making a status quo bias rational.
6.5. Further Research
Designing a constitution permits more than banning diﬀerentiation and side payments.
More importantly, a constitution defines how future decisions will be taken, that is, the
rules of the bargaining game. Investigating how diﬀerent constitutional rules are able
to mitigate the ineﬃciencies described in this paper is an interesting issue for future
research. This raises a host of questions. To which extent, for example, is it a good idea
to concentrate the agenda-setting power to one region? How does the optimal constitution
change when the number of regions increases? What is the optimal majority rule?
The general lesson of this paper is that parties negotiating under private information
may benefit from simply constraining the agenda. With a great deal of discretion, a
strong party is fully able to exploit its bargaining power. It is then very beneficial to
signal bargaining power and screen the other party. Typically, this creates distortions. By
instead restricting the agenda, the conflict of interest between the parties may decrease,
it becomes more diﬃcult to exploit bargaining power, and distortions diminish. If the
value of discretion is small, eﬃciency benefits from constraining the agenda.
This trade-oﬀ between flexibility and costly signaling can be applied to many contexts.
Take the Theory of the Firm. By definition, a market transaction requires a price and
thus, a conflict between the seller and the buyer. It is no surprise that most bargaining
theory is developed for such situations. If the transaction were undertaken in-house,
however, the incentives might be less conflicting. In fact, it can be argued that in-house
transactions are insensitive to whether the realized benefit is larger than the realized cost.
These pieces of information may be private to diﬀerent employees with small incentives
to coordinate. But, as they are not haggling, delay is reduced. The traditional theory of
the firm, such it is surveyed by Hart (1995), emphasizes how ownership aﬀects incentives
prior to negotiations. It might be time to turn the attention to ex post transaction costs.
When is it good to forbid side payments within firms? Which transactions are better
undertaken within instead of between firms?
Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
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Proof of (i) and (ii): At any point in time, a history after N oﬀers is the set of
proposed and rejected oﬀers: HN = {dN , tN}N . Let HN denote the set of such possible
histories, define H0 ≡ (0, 0) , and let H be the set of all possible histories (any N). A
pure strategy for A is a rule fA that says, whenever N is even, whether A should accept
the previous oﬀer or make a counteroﬀer dN+1 after some delay tN+1 − tN ≥ 0; that is,
fA : H −→ {accept, (R,R+)}. Let A’s belief bA : H −→ [0, 1] denote the probability A
puts on the event vB = v after some history HN . Similarly, fB and bB denote B’s strategy
and beliefs about A’s type. At time t = 0, bA = bB = 1/2.
A sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) is a set of strategies and beliefs
such that after every history, each player’s strategy is optimal, given its beliefs and the
other player’s strategy, and the beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule. The intuitive
criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987) is a refinement which puts restrictions on beliefs outside
the equilibrium. In essence, it requires that any action out of equilibrium beneficial for
exactly one type, implies that beliefs place probability one on this type. To ensure a
unique equilibrium in the above game in a simple way, I will apply an even stronger
updating rule.
Definition 4: Let (d, t)i denote an (expected) outcome if i is of high type, given
i’s belief. Let Fi ≡ {(d, t)|(d, t) Âi (d, t)i if and only if vi = v}. The intuitive criterion
requires that bj = 1 after i 6= j has taken some action leading to an outcome in Fi. In
addition, the optimistic intuitive criterion requires that bi = 0 if i has taken some action
leading to an outcome outside Fi.
This criterion requires that after a region has made an oﬀer, unless this oﬀer is
unattractive for the high-type region, the region is believed (by the other region) to
be of high type for certain. This way of updating beliefs is quite "optimistic", though
certainly possible.
Suppose A is revealed to be of low type by making an oﬀer at tA. A high-type B
will not be able to convince A that B is of low type. Thus, B accepts any d ≤ d0, and
will itself immediately propose d0 if A’s proposal is some d > d0 (remember that d0 is the
equilibrium when bA = 0 and bB = 1 are correct beliefs). A low-type B, on the other
hand, maximizes its utility by proposing an oﬀer in FB which is acceptable by A if bA = 1;
that is, it must be unattractive to a high-type B and acceptable to the low-type A with
beliefs bA = 1:
Max
(d,t2)
1
2
[v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e)) d] δt2 s.t.
1
2
[v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e)) d0] δtA ≥ 1
2
[v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e)) d] δt2
d ≥ 0.
The solution is
d = 0
δt2−tA =
v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e)) d0
v − 1 .
Suppose instead that A is revealed to be of high type by making an oﬀer at tA. A
high-type B will not be able to convince A that B is of low type, and B accepts any
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d ≤ 0, and will itself immediately propose d = 0 if A’s proposal is some d > 0 (remember
that d = 0 is the equilibrium when bA = 0 and bB = 0 are correct beliefs). A low-type
B, on the other hand, maximizes its utility by proposing an acceptable oﬀer in FB; that
is, it must be unattractive to a high-type B and acceptable to a high-type A with beliefs
bA = 1:
Max
(d,tB)
1
2
[v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e)) d] δtB s.t.
1
2
(v − 1) δtA ≥ 1
2
[v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e)) d] δtB
d ≥ −d0.
The solution is
d = −d0
δtB−tA =
v − 1
v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e)) d0 .
Having found B’s optimal strategy, let us turn to A. If A is of high type, it can (by
Definition 4) not aﬀord to persuade B to believe that bB 6= 0. Thus, A can either make a
pooling oﬀer −d0 which is acceptable to B whatever its type, or A can make a screening
oﬀer d = 0 which will only be accepted by a high-type B. Since we know B’s reaction in
either case, it is easily calculated that A is better oﬀ by making the screening oﬀer d = 0
at tA = 0. This gives A the expected utility
uA =
1
4
(v − 1) + 1
4
[v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e)) d0] δtB .
The low-type A’s problem is then to make an oﬀer which is not attractive to a high-type
A, but acceptable to a high-type B with beliefs bB = 1 (it can easily be shown that a
low-type A will not make a pooling oﬀer):
Max
(d,tA)
1
4
[v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e)) d] δtA + 1
4
(v − 1) δt2−tAδtA s.t.
uA ≥
1
4
[v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e)) d] δtA + 1
4
(v − 1) δt2−tAδtA
d ≤ d0.
The solution can be shown to be
d = d0
δtA =
v − 1
v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e)) d0 .
Combined, it follows that δt1 ≡ δtA = δtB and δt2 are such as these are defined in (3.4).
In equilibrium, the low type will delay and the high type will not. The beliefs in the
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optimistic intuitive criterion are therefore consistent with Bayes’ rule. It follows that
these beliefs and the strategies above constitute a sequential equilibrium, which is unique
under the optimistic intuitive criterion. Since strategies are symmetric in the sense that
δtA = δtB , and since B acts after A’s type has been revealed, the low-type A’s strategy is
not attractive to the high-type A, even if A had "spied" on B and had beliefs bA ∈ {0, 1}.
Thus, the mechanism is transparent. It can also be shown that no pooling equilibrium
exists under a weak form of the intuitive criterion (where bj = 1/2, unless i’s action is in
Fi).35
Proof of (iii): According to Definition 2, a mechanism is a rule mapping any pair of
announced types to an outcome (d, t). Readers preferring to design static mechanism
in terms of the probability of agreement, instead of time, can simply let δti denote this
probability. I will now calculate the most eﬃcient mechanism that is stable (d = dR) and
incentive compatible, even if a region should be aware of the other region’s announcement
(i.e. robust). This mechanism maximizes the total expected utility by minimizing delay,
subject to these constraints and the regions’ incentive constraints. The participation
constraints are fulfilled when d = dR. Let t0, t1 and t2 denote the time of the settlement
when, respectively, none, one and both regions announce low type. Since the game is
symmetric, I do not need to let t1 depend on which of the regions announces low type
(this would not change the result). The problem is
Max
t0,t1,t2∈[0,∞)
ud =
1
4
(v− 1)δt0 + 1
4
(v− 1)δt2 + 1
2
·
1
2
(v + v)− 1 +
µ
1
2
− e
¶
(v − v)d0
¸
δt1 s.t.
1
2
(v − 1) δt0 ≥ 1
2
[v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))d0]δt1 (IC)
1
2
[v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e))d0]δt1 ≥ 1
2
(v − 1) δt2 , (IC)
where (IC) and (IC) are the high type’s incentive constraints when the other region
announces high and low type, respectively. When (IC) and (IC) both hold, truthful
announcement becomes optimal also if a region is uncertain about the other region’s
type. It is easily checked that the low type’s incentive constraints are not binding, and
these can therefore be ignored. The solution is that t0 = 0, while t1 and t2 are set such
that
δt1 =
v − 1
v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))d0
δt2 =
v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e))d0
v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))d0 ⇔ (3.4).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: Define the net values of a uniform agreement as
n ≡ v − 1 and n ≡ v − 1. Note that n = 2(v − 1)h/(h + 1) and
¡
1− δt2
¢
= 2
¡
1− δt1
¢
.
35In a previous version of this paper, the probability that vi = v could be p > 1/2. Then, pooling
oﬀers might be optimal and pooling equilibria where all types suggest a uniform policy d = 0 might exist.
Uniform policies might then be the outcome even if heterogeneous regions are allowed to diﬀerentiate the
policy. However, the set of parameters under which such pooling equilibria exist is strictly smaller than
the set of parameters under which a commitment to uniform policies would be good. The results of the
paper thus survive, while the analysis would be more complicated.
24
By comparing (3.5) and (3.6):
ud ≤ u0 ⇔
1
2
µ
1
2
− e
¶
(v − v)d0δt1 ≤ 1
2
µ
v + v
2
− 1
¶¡
1− δt1
¢
+
1
4
(v − 1)
¡
1− δt2
¢
⇔
(1− 2e) (v − v)d0 ≤ (v + v − 2)
¡
1− δt1
¢
/δt1 + (v − 1)2
¡
1− δt1
¢
/δt1 ⇔
(1− 2e) (v − v)d0 ≤ (3v + v − 4) [1− v(1− 2e)]d
0
v − 1 ⇔
(1− 2e) (n− n)n ≤ (3n+ n) [1− (n+ 1) (1− 2e)]⇔
(1− 2e) (2n+ 2n)n ≤ (3n+ n) 2e⇔
(1− 2e) 2(v − 1)h ≤ (3 + h) e⇔
h [2 (1− 2e) (v − 1)− e] ≤ 3e⇔ (3.7).
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof of (ii): This proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. With side payments, a his-
tory after N oﬀers is the set of proposed and rejected oﬀers: HN = {dN , sN , tN}N . A pure
strategy for A is a rule fA : H −→ {accept, ([−D,D] ,R,R+)}. Let (d, s, t)i denote an (ex-
pected) outcome if i is of high type, given i’s belief. Let Fi ≡ {(d, s, t)|(d, s, t) Âi (d, s, t)i if and only if vi
The intuitive criterion requires that bj = 1 after i 6= j has taken some action leading to
an outcome in Fi. In addition, the optimistic intuitive criterion requires that bi = 0, if i
has taken some action leading to an outcome outside Fi. The attention will be restricted
to stable oﬀers (Definition 1).36
Suppose e ≤ 1/2, and that A is revealed to be of low type by making an oﬀer at tsA. A
high-type B will not be able to convince A that B is of low type, and will propose d = D
and s = s, giving B utility uB = [v + v − 2 + (v − v) (1− 2e)D] /4. In considering A’s
oﬀer, a high-type B accepts anything that would make B’s utility at least as large as uB.
A low-type B, on the other hand, prefers to propose a stable agreement (0, 0, ts2) ∈ FB
which is thus acceptable to A
Max
ts2≥tsA
1
2
(v − 1) δts2 s.t.
uBδ
tsA ≥ 1
2
(v − 1) δts2.
The solution is
δt
s
2−tsA =
v + v − 2 + (v − v) (1− 2e)D
2 (v − 1) if (1− 2e)D < 1
ts2 = t
s
A if (1− 2e)D ≥ 1.
36Wang (2000) also restricts the attention to stable oﬀers in his derivation of unique equilibria in the
Cramton (1992) model. See the next footnote for my justification for restricting the attention to stable
oﬀers.
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Suppose instead that A is revealed to be of high type by making an oﬀer at tsA. A high-
type B will not be able to convince A that B is of low type, and will propose d = s = 0,
giving B utility (v − 1) /2. In considering A’s oﬀer, a high-type B accepts anything that
would make B’s utility at least as large as (v − 1) /2. A low-type B, on the other hand,
prefers to propose the stable agreement (−D,−s, tsB) ∈ FB which is thus acceptable to A.
Max
tsB≥tsA
1
2
[v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))D + s] δtsB s.t.
1
2
(v − 1) δtsA ≥ 1
2
[v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))D + s] δtsB .
Substituting for s, the solution becomes
δt
s
B−tsA =
v − 1
v − 1 + (v − v) (1− (1− 2e)D) /2 if (1− 2e)D < 1
tsB = t
s
A if (1− 2e)D ≥ 1.
Having found B’s optimal strategy, let us turn to A. If A is of high type, it cannot
aﬀord to persuade B to believe that bB 6= 0. Thus, A can either make a pooling oﬀer
which is acceptable to B whatever its type, or A can make a screening oﬀer which only
a high-type B would accept. Since we know B’s reaction in either case, it is easy to
calculate that A is better oﬀ by making the screening oﬀer d = s = 0 at tsA = 0. This
gives A the expected utility
uA =
1
4
(v − 1) + 1
4
[v − 1− (1− v(1− 2e))D − s] δtsB .
The low-type A’s problem is then to make an oﬀer which is not attractive to a high-type A,
but acceptable to a high-typeB with beliefs bB = 1. It can easily be shown that a low-type
A will not make a pooling oﬀer, so A proposes the stable agreement
¡
D, s, tsA
¢
∈ FA
Max
tsA≥0
1
4
[v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))D + s] δtsA + 1
4
(v − 1) δts2−tsAδtsA s.t.
uA ≥
1
4
[v − 1 + (1− v(1− 2e))D + s] δtsA + 1
4
(v − 1) δts2−tsAδtsA .
The solution can be shown to be
δt
s
A =
v − 1
v − 1 + (v − v) (1− (1− 2e)D) /2 if (1− 2e)D < 1
tsA = 0 if (1− 2e)D ≥ 1.
If e > 1/2, the proof proceeds in the same way, but since d changes signs in the optimal
agreement, (1− 2e) should be replaced by |1− 2e|. Combined, it follows that δts1 ≡ δtsA =
δt
s
B and δt
s
2 are such as these are defined in (4.3). In equilibrium, the low type will delay
and the high type will not. The beliefs under the optimistic intuitive criterion are therefore
consistent with Bayes’ rule. It follows that these beliefs and the above strategies comprise
a unique equilibrium under the optimistic intuitive criterion when the agreement must be
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stable.37 It can also be shown that no pooling equilibrium exists under a weak form of
the intuitive criterion (where bj = 1/2 unless i’s action is in Fi).38
Proof of (i): The above equilibrium is shown to be unique under the optimistic intuitive
criterion and when the agreement is stable. Thus, it is a sequential equilibrium if proposals
must be stable. If beliefs are such that bi = 0 whenever j 6= i proposes an agreement
which is not stable, it is easily shown that the above strategies constitute a sequential
equilibrium even if oﬀers do not have to be stable.
Proof of (iii): I will now calculate the most eﬃcient mechanism that is stable and robust.
This mechanism maximizes the total expected utility by minimizing delay subject to
these constraints and the regions’ incentive constraints. The participation constraints are
fulfilled when the agreement is stable. Let ts0, t
s
1 and t
s
2 denote the time of the settlement
when none, one and both regions announce low type, respectively. Since the game is
symmetric, I do not need to let ts1 depend on which of the regions announces low type
(doing this would not change the result). Suppose e ≥ 1/2. The problem is
Max
ts0,ts1,ts2≥0
uds =
1
4
(v − 1)δts0 + 1
2
·
v + v
2
− 1 + (v − v)
¯¯¯¯
1
2
− e
¯¯¯¯
D
¸
δt
s
1 +
1
4
(v − 1)δts2 s.t.
1
2
(v − 1)δts0 ≥ 1
2
[v − 1 + (1− v (1− 2e))D + s] δts1 (IC)
1
2
[v − 1− (1− v (1− 2e))D − s] δts1 ≥ 1
2
(v − 1)δts2 (IC)
where (IC) and (IC) are the high type’s incentive constraints when the other region is of
high and low type, respectively. When (IC) and (IC) both hold, truthful announcements
are optimal also if a region is uncertain about the other region’s type. It is easily checked
that the low type’s incentive constraints are not binding. Substituting for s, it follows
that ts0 = 0, while t
s
1 and t
s
2 are set such that:
δt
s
1 =
v − 1
(v − 1) + 1
2
(v − v) (1− (1− 2e)D)
and
δt
s
2 =
(v − 1)− 1
2
(v − v) (1− (1− 2e)D)
(v − 1) + 1
2
(v − v) (1− (1− 2e)D)
if (1− 2e)D < 1.
ts0 = t
s
1 = t
s
2 = 0 if (1− 2e)D ≥ 1.
If e > 1/2, a similar maximization problem gives the same solution if only (1− 2e) is
replaced by |1− 2e|.
37Why require the agreement to be stable? If A is proved to be of low type, a low-type B could save
delay by proposing d = −D instead of d = 0, by adjusting the side payments accordingly (to equalize
utilities). If small transaction costs were related to the side payments, however, A and B would prefer
to renegotiate and set d = s = 0, when both are proved to be of low type. Hence, signaling by proposing
d = −D would not be credible, since the agreement would not be stable.
38In a previous version of this paper, the probability that vi = v could be p > 1/2. Then, pooling
oﬀers might be optimal, and pooling equilibria where all types suggest d = s = 0 might exist. Uniform
policies might then be the outcome even if heterogeneous regions are allowed to diﬀerentiate the policy
and negotiate over side payments. However, the set of parameters under which such pooling equilibria
exist is strictly smaller than the set of parameters under which a commitment would be good. The results
of the paper thus survive, while the analysis would be more complicated.
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PROOFOFPROPOSITION 3: IfD |1− 2e| ≥ 1, we know that the policy is optimally
diﬀerentiated with no delay. Therefore, assume that D |1− 2e| < 1, and apply the same
definitions of n and n as in the proof of Proposition 1. u0 ≥ uds whenever the benefit
from an optimally diﬀerentiated policy is smaller that the cost of delay:
1
2
µ
(v − v)
¯¯¯¯
1
2
− e
¯¯¯¯
D
¶
δt
s
1 ≤ 1
2
µ
v + v
2
− 1
¶
(1− δts1) + 1
4
(v − 1)(1− δts2)⇔
(v − v) |1− 2e|D ≤ (v + v − 2)1− δ
ts1
δt
s
1
+ (v − 1)2(1− δ
ts1)
δt
s
1
⇔
(v − v) |1− 2e|D ≤ [3v + v − 4] (v − v) (1− |1− 2e|D)
2 (v − 1) ⇔
2n |1− 2e|D ≤ [3n+ n] (1− |1− 2e|D)⇔
n(3 |1− 2e|D − 1) ≤ 3n (1− |1− 2e|D)⇔
h
µ
3 |1− 2e|D − 1
1− |1− 2e|D
¶
≤ 3⇔ (4.5).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Side payments are beneficial if and only if usd ≥ ud,
which requires:
[v + v − 2 + (v − v) |1− 2e|D] δts1 + (v − 1)δts2 ≥
[v + v − 2 + (v − v) (1− 2e) d0] δt1 + (v − 1)δt2 .
By introducing side payments, there are always gains from trade since |1− 2e|D ≥
(1− 2e) d0. Suppose that e ≤ 1/2 and d0 < D. Comparing (3.4) and (4.3), we notice
that side payments reduce delay whenever (v− v) (1− |1− 2e|D) /2 < [1− v (1− 2e)] d0.
Substituting for d0, we observe that this condition always holds! Suppose, therefore, that
d0 /∈ [−D,D]. When this condition binds, d0 should be substituted in equilibrium by D.
Then, there are no gains from trade, and side payments are good if and only if they reduce
delay. The condition for this is:
(v − v) (1− (1− 2e)D) ≤ 2 [1− v (1− 2e)]D⇔
(v − v) ≤ D [2− (v + v) (1− 2e)]⇔
h− 1 ≤ D
·
2e(h+ 1)
v − 1 − (h+ 1) (1− 2e)
¸
⇔ (5.1).
This condition will always be satisfied when d0 < D. If e > 1/2, the requirement for when
side payments reduce delay is relaxed. In addition, the gains from trade are larger. Thus,
the larger is e, the more likely are side payments to increase eﬃciency.
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